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Although relativism may be said to be one of the oldest doctrines in philosophy, dating
back  to  the  teachings  of  Protagoras  in  the  5th century  B.C.,  when  it  comes  to
contemporary  philosophy,  there  is  no  consensus  on  what  makes  a  view qualify  as
"relativist". The problem is particularly accute in metaethics, since most of the views
that  up  to  a  decade  ago  were  described  as  “relativist”  would  be  more  accurately
described as "contextualist" or even “expressivist” in light of the distinctions currenty
drawn in philosophy of language and semantics. In this  chapter, we distinguish two
construals of relativism, developed in sections 2 and 3 respectively: the “metaphysical”
construal, based on the idea that there is no single, absolute, universal morality, and the
“semantic” construal, based on the idea that the truth value of moral claims is relative to
a set of moral standards, or moral practices, or some other suitable parameter. Section 1
introduces  the  core  relativist  ideas  in  an  informal  way,  and  warns  against  possible
misinterpretations.  
1. Getting a grip on metaethical relativism
If relativism were to be captured by a slogan, it would be the idea that what is (morally)
good or bad is relative. Of course, as any slogan, it leaves many questions open. To
what is it that moral goodness or badness is relative? Is every moral truth relative in this
sense, or are only some moral truths relative? Assuming that moral truths are relative,
say, to moral codes, are all of these on a par, or could it be that some moral codes are
better than others? And so on. Different answers to these questions pave the way to
often very different  views,  some of  which may be less  plausible  than others.  As a
consequence, the term “relativism” as used in metaethics covers a variety of positions,
making  it  sometimes  difficult  to  see  which  positions  are  supported  by  which
motivations,  or  which  problems they face.  This  chapter  aims to  help clarifying the
confusion, by shifting the focus from the wide range of putative relativist views from
the  last  century,  discussed  in  numerous  survey  articles  on  moral  and  metaethical
relativism, to a much narrower family of theoretical positions that have taken shape in
this century, influenced by developments from formal philosophy of language, such as
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Kölbel (2002), Brogaard (2008, 2012), Beebe (2012), Schafer (2012), Egan (2012), or
MacFarlane (2014).
I will distinguish two construals of metaethical relativism, discussed in Sections 2
and 3 respectively. On the metaphysical  construal, relativism amounts to the idea that
there is no single, absolute, universally valid morality, or set of moral values, or codes,
or norms. On the semantic construal, it relies on the idea that the truth value of a moral
claim  is  relative  to  a  special  parameter,  the  nature  of  which  may  vary  from  one
framework to another. Note that on either construal, an important issue remains open,
namely, what it is that moral questions are relative to. Possible answers include: moral
codes, norms, systems of values, sets of (possibly shared) beliefs and desires, and so on.
In addition,  which  moral codes/norms/values/beliefs etc. are relevant to assessing the
truth of a moral claim also allows for different answers. They could be those endorsed
by some specific agent, or shared by a group of agents, or endorsed by a whole society,
or they could be those of an “assessor” evaluating a given moral claim for its truth
value. While this important issue does ultimately require an answer (and the answer is
far  from obvious;  see Shafer-Landau 2004),  it  is  specific  ethical  theories that  must
provide the answer. The more general and abstract relativist frameworks discussed in
metaethics  need  not  commit  to  any  definite  answer,  leaving  the  parameter  under
consideration open.       
Turning back to the distinction between metaphysical vs. semantic relativism, even
if  the  two often  go  hand  in  hand,  the  distinction  remains  important  because  many
prominent relativist figures, including Gilbert Harman, David Wong, Carol Rovane, or
David  Velleman,  have  defended  metaphysical  relativism  without  committing
themselves  to  any specific  semantics  for  moral  discourse.  As  regards  the  semantic
construal, we will see that the idea that the truth of moral claims depends on some
suitable  parameter  applies  equally  well  to  contextualist  as  to  (genuinely)  relativist
views,  the  difference  coming  from how  this  dependence  is  further  analyzed.  Thus
contextualists such as Dreier (1990) or Silk (2016) take it to be merely an instance of
the  more  general  phenomenon  of  context-dependence  in  language:  a  sentence
containing a moral expression, such as “This action is (morally) good”, can only be
interpreted if one points to some specific set of moral norms, roughly in the same way
in which the complex demonstrative “this action” requires pointing to some specific
action for the sentence to be interpreted. For a contextualist, then, the parameter at stake
not only affects the truth value, but also the content that the moral sentence expresses in
a given context. For a relativist, on the other hand, a given moral sentence (once its
context-sensitive expressions have been resolved) always expresses the same content,
regardless of the context in which it is uttered; however, it may still receive different
truth values, provided that it is evaluated with respect to different sets of moral norms.
Thus  in  a  relativist  semantics,  the  way in  which  the  truth  value  of  a  moral  claim
depends on this special parameter is quite unlike the more familiar forms of context-
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dependence in language.    
Now that the general structure of the chapter has been laid out, it will help to get
some intuitive grip on the motivations that may push us towards relativism in the first
place. Consider a person – call her Saskia – who is facing a difficult moral dilemma.
Saskia is in her fifth month of pregnancy, and has just found out that the foetus suffers
from a serious deformation, and that if she carries the pregnancy, her child will be a
severely damaged human being bound to suffer in  horrible ways through their  life.
Saskia must choose between terminating the pregnancy or carrying on with it. 
This is a fairly realistic case, in which for many people, neither horn of Saskia's
dilemma will appear as the obviously right choice. At the same time, many other people
will consider, without hesitation, that Saskia ought to keep the foetus (e.g. people who
endorse certain Christian values and who think that abortion is not permissible under
any circumstances). And conversely, many people will have no hesitation in claiming
that Saskia ought to terminate the pregnancy (e.g. those who consider it to be morally
wrong to give birth to an individual who is bound to suffer horribly). The aim of this
example is to illustrate a situation such that from one perspective, the moral question
whether Saskia ought to carry pregnancy or not does not seem to have an objective,
universally valid answer; from yet another perspective, in which a certain kind of moral
values is taken for granted, the obvious answer is that she ought to keep the child; and
from yet a third perspective, an equally obvious answer is that she ought to terminate
pregnancy. 
We have presented the example as a case of moral  deliberation, regarding what
Saskia (morally)  ought  to do.  But  the case may also be presented as  one of  moral
evaluation. Thus someone coming from a contra-abortion perspective will judge that if
Saskia terminates the pregnancy, that will be morally worse than if she doesn't, while
someone else coming from a pro-abortion perspective will judge that her terminating
the pregnancy is a morally better choice. The two individuals, who evaluate Saskia's
action from such different moral backgrounds, are in a disagreement that does not seem
to  be  resolvable  on  any  objective,  factual  grounds.  This  kind  of  persistent  and
irresolvable moral disagreement suggests that there are moral issues whose answers
crucially depend on the set of moral values and norms against which they are evaluated.
To be sure, those who believe in objective and absolute moral values will likely see
this kind of case as merely a difficult and complex ethical case, one in which various
considerations and norms pulling in different directions are at play, yet one for which at
the end, there must be one and only one right answer. By contrast, a relativist has an
elegant explanation of why it is so difficult to say what the right answer is: it is because,
for them, there is no such thing as “the right answer” independently of some underlying
set of moral values or norms. In sum, what emerges is the idea that there  are moral
issues that cannot be resolved unless we specify some set of moral norms, or some
other  suitable  factor  that  serves  the  same  purpose,  such  as  culture,  educational
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background,  the  practices  of  a  community,  or  what  not.  We  have  started  with  an
example from everyday life, concerning an individual and the decision she faces, but
the range of cases can be expanded to more general issues, such as the question whether
abortion is  morally permissible  tout  court,  whether  euthanasia,  decapitation,  torture,
and the like, are permissible (and under which conditions), and similar ethical issues
that different societies and cultures approach in different ways.  
The fact  that  different  cultures may endorse very different  moral  principles  has
often been seen as a strong motivation for relativism (Wong 1984, 2006; Prinz 2007;
Velleman  2013;  Rovane  2013).  However,  we  must  be  cautious  in  what  theoretical
consequences we might want to draw from such cross-cultural divergences in morality,
as they may easily lead to misinterpreting the view. Consider the case of female genital
mutilation, a.k.a. female circumcision, a painful ritual practiced in certain countries that
often brings about extremely harmful consequences to the women who undergo it. The
fact that an entire society endorses a set of norms and practices that not only make
genital mutilation acceptable but even required does not imply that such a set of norms
constitutes indeed an admissible set of moral norms. In other words, the step from the
claim that genital mutilation is accepted by a given society to the claim that there is a
set of genuinely moral norms relative to which genital mutilation is permissible is a step
that requires further argument. For instance, Kopelman (2011) takes genital mutilation
as a  case study to argue that  certain relativist  views are implausible.  However,  her
argument targets only those relativist views that accept the abovementioned step. 
We have stressed that it is unclear how precisely to define relativism and how to
characterize the main tenets that the various relativist approaches have in common. But
there  are  ideas  that  are  often  thought  of  as  "relativist"  such  that  it  is  clear  that
relativism  is  not  committed  to  them.  Such  misconceptions  are  unfortunately
widespread,  in  and outside  philosophy,  hence it  is  important  to  dispell  them at  the
outset. For ease of exposition, let us provisorily take relativism to be the view that the
truth of moral claims is relative to a set of moral norms, perhaps paired with the view
that there isn't a single, absolute such set of moral norms. Then the view had better
entail that  there are  moral claims that are true relative to one such set of norms and
false  relative  to  another.  Unfortunately,  moral  relativism  is  often  taken  to  entail
something stronger,  namely that  for  every  moral  claim,  there is  some set  of  norms
relative to which the claim is true and some other set relative to which the claim is
false. This view is then (and rightly so) dismissed as implausible, on grounds that it is
implausible  to accept that,  for example,  there should be a set  of moral norms with
respect to which genocide is morally acceptable, or with respect to which slavery is
right while altruism is wrong. Indeed, for most of us, it is even impossible to imagine
what the world should be like for it to be the case that genocide is good, a phenomenon
known as imaginative resistence (Gendler 2000). 
However,  relativism,  as  characterized  above,  only  entails  the  weaker,  not  the
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stronger,  view.  This  is  not  to  say,  though,  there  are  no  relativists  who endorse  the
stronger view. Thus Brogaard notes “In a full-blown relativist framework, the sentence
'It is morally permissible to murder people' comes out true when uttered by the serial
killer. To many people, this is highly unintuitive” (2012: 547), and then goes on to
defend such a “full-blown” framework against the burden of intuitions. However, the
important point is that moral relativism is  compatible with the idea that there can be
higher order constraints on moralities, or on acceptable sets on moral norms, or moral
codes. For instance, one such higher order constraint may be that no set of moral norms
should dictate incompatible actions: no set of norms should be such that, for some F,
both "You ought to F" and "You ought not to F" are true relative to that set. Just as there
may be higher order constraints that rule out sets of norms that licence incompatible
deontic claims, there may be constraints that rule out sets of norms that licence, for
example, the claim that genocide is good, or that female circumcision is permissible. Of
course, it remains an important question, perhaps ever the most  pressing question for
metaethical relativism, to say whether such constraints are absolute or are also relative
(and if so, to what), and what it is that they ultimately rest upon. 
  
2. Relativism as a plurality of moralities: the metaphysical construal
On the metaphysical construal, metaethical relativism is, roughly, the view that there is
no single, absolute, universal morality. This contrasts with the semantic construal, on
which it is the view that the truth value of a moral claim is relative to some suitable
parameter:  a  morality,  or  a  set  of  moral  norms,  standars,  or  whatever;  to  which
parameters exactly is a debatable question, answered differently by different theories.
To make the distinction more intuitive, compare it with relativism about motion. The
question  whether  the  Eiffel  Tower  is  moving  can  only  be  answered  if  we  specify
relative to  what.  Disregarding possible tectonic movements,  the Eiffel  Tower is  not
moving relative, say, to Palais Chaillot, and at the same time it is moving relative to the
Sun. On the metaphysical construal, relativism about motion is the (uncontroversial)
thesis  that  there  is  no absolute  motion,  there is  only motion  relative  to  a  frame of
reference. On the semantic construal, it is the (equally uncontroversial) thesis that the
truth value of a sentence such as “The Eiffel Tower is moving” depends on a hidden
parameter, which specifies the frame of reference of the movement. Returning to the
example of Saskia's dilemma, relativism, metaphysically understood, would say that
there is no single, absolute, universally valid scale of comparison that makes one choice
morally  better  than  the  other  –  and this  would  still  hold even in  the  absence  of  a
language  that  can  express  such  things  as  “This  choice  is  (morally)  better  than  the
other.” Semantic relativism, on the other hand, would say that in order to ascribe a truth
value  to  a  statement  such  as  “It  would  be  morally  better  if  Saskia  terminated  the
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pregnancy”, or “She ought to terminate the pregnancy”, we need to evaluate it with
respect  to  a  set  of  moral  values  (or  some analogous  parameter).  Although the  two
construals are intimately linked, they are theoretically independent, as will  be made
clear  in  the  next  section.  The  remainder  of  this  section  aims  to  illustrate  the
metaphysical construal with two views: Gilbert  Harman's view, considered a classic
example of metaethical relativism, and a fairly different, dispositionalist view defended
in  Egan  (2012),  which  builds  on  Lewis  (1989).  We see  Harman  as  proposing  a
metaphysical rather than semantic version of relativism because his focus is on what
morality and moral values are, rather than on how moral language works; in his own
words, “Moral relativism is the theory that there is not a single true morality. It is not a
theory of what people mean by their moral judgements” (2012: 13). Egan's proposal, on
the  other  hand,  lends  itself  equally  well  to  a  metaphysical  as  to  a  semantic
interpretation. We have chosen to classify it under the metaphysical construal – even if
that  need  not  be  what  Egan  himself  would  prefer  –  in  order  to  demonstrate  how
relativism may encompass substantively different views. 
***
Through a series of influential articles, united in Harman (2000), Harman became a
key figure in the defense of metaethical relativism. There are two main motivations to
his view. One is  the observation that in  order to make a moral judgement,  such as
whether someone ought to act in a certain way, it is necessary to take into account the
moral considerations and reasons to which this person is responsive. Harman further
observes that when we are asked to make such moral judgments, we normally only do
so if we take it for granted that the person whose moral deliberation we are judging is
responsive  to  the  same  sort  of  reasons  and  considerations  that  we  ourselves  are
responsive  to.  The second motivation  relies  on  the  idea  that  an agent's  actions  are
normally motivated by their attitudes, and in particular, beliefs about what they ought to
do. This motivation is tied to issues about cognitivism (see Chapter 19) and internalism
(see Darwall 1997), but for our purposes, we may simply retain the idea that the answer
to the question whether an agent ought to act in a certain way or not depends on their
motivating attitudes.
Harman's proposal, in a nutshell, combines the following two ideas. First, morality
arises from a set of implicit, not necessarily conscious, agreements to which a group
commits, and since the agreements reached by different groups may be different and
evolve over time, there will be no single, absolute morality. Second, whether an agent
ought to do something is relative to their considerations and, especially, their motivating
attitudes, where these are shaped by the moral agreements that the agent has undertaken
with  respect  to  others.  Finally,  note  that  Harman's  relativism is  only  a  “first-order
relativism”,  compatible  with  the  possibility  of  objective  higher-order  constraints  on
moralities. He stresses: “I am not denying (nor am I asserting) that some moralities are
"objectively"  better  than  others  or  that  there  are  objective  standards  for  assessing
Isidora Stojanovic 6 (Metaethical) Relativism 
moralities” (1975: p. 4). 
***
A very different kind of relativist proposal has recently emerged from the work of
Andy Egan. His point of departure is the dispositionalist theory of value from Lewis
(1989),  to  which  he  gives  a  relativist  twist,  relying  once  more  on  Lewis's  ideas
regarding  attitude  self-ascription  (Lewis  1981).  The  general  gist  of  dispositionalist
theories may be captured by the following schema:
(Disp) x is (an instance of value) F iff 
x is disposed to elicit response R in subject(s) S in conditions C
As can be easily anticipated, there are many ways of defending dispositionalism,
depending on what one does with the different variables in the schema: F, R, S, C. In
particular,  different  ways  of  approaching  the  subject  parameter  S  will  differentiate
between possible  invariantist  versions,  contextualist  versions, and  relativist  versions
(one of which is Egan's). Egan (2012)'s proposal concerns values in general, while Egan
(2013)  applies  it  to  the  case  of  personal  taste,  and  a  similar  account  (though  not
necessarily “relativist”) is defended in Bjornsson (ms.). But before we see how (Disp)
may be developed into a form relativism, let us illustrate the dispositionalist idea with
an example of moral value. Let's take F to stand for 'morally wrong' (hence a negative
moral value). One way of instantiating (Disp) would be to say that Saskia's choosing to
give birth to a severely damaged child who is bound to suffer horribly is morally wrong
iff in normal conditions, it is likely to elicit strong moral disapproval from people. The
conditions parameter C is important because it allows for different moral assessments
about individuals who fully and knowingly control their actions vs. individuals who act
under hypnosis, drug influence, or are forced to act as they do.  
We have spoken in terms of “disapproval from people”, but one might ask, which
people? A view that says “people in general” would qualify as an invariantist version of
dispositionalism. On the other hand, if we allow for a greater variability regarding who
the relevant subjects might be, we get various forms of contextualism and relativism.
One option is to say that the people at stake are  us (which is Lewis's own take). This
already leads to a form of relativity. For  we may judge Saskia's action to be morally
wrong (because it elicits strong disapproval in us) while others may judge her action
not to be morally wrong (because it actually elicits approval in them). Whether a view
along  these  lines  is  contextualist  or  genuinely  relativist  will  depend  on  further
assumptions. Anticipating a distinction introduced in the next section, let us say that a
view is “contextualist” if the content of assertions and beliefs involving the moral value
at stake depends on who S is, and “relativist” if only the  truth  of such assertions or
beliefs,  but  not  their  content,  depends  on  S.  Thus  on  a  possible  contextualist
interpretation of our example, when different people say “Saskia did something morally
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bad”, they say different things: if Inma utters the sentence, she expresses the proposition
that Saskia's action elicits disapproval in her kin; if Tarek utters it,  he expresses the
proposition that it elicits disapproval in his kin. On a possible relativist interpretation,
Inma  and  Tarek  say  the  same  thing;  however,  what  they  say  is  not  a  classical
proposition, since in order to deliver a truth value, it needs to be evaluated at a subject
or a group of subjects. On Egan's interpretation (following Lewis), the content shared
by Tarek and Inma's assertions – and beliefs – is the property of being a subject such
that Saskia's action is disposed to elicit disapproval in you. Adapting the proposal from
Lewis (1981), Egan suggests that to believe this kind of content is to self-ascribe the
property at stake.
3. Relativism as a variability in truth value: the semantic construal
On its semantic construal, metaethical relativism builds on the idea that the truth value
of moral claims is relative to a special parameter, which, depending on the theory, may
be a set of moral norms, codes, standards or considerations, proper to an agent or shared
by  a  group,  society,  culture,  what  not.  For  simplicity,  let  us  call  it  the  morality
parameter. Because there are many ways in which truth value may depend on such a
parameter, there will be many ways in which metaethical relativism may be developed
into a semantic theory of moral language. One line of development leads to what is
nowadays more accurately called “methaetical contextualism”, a view defended e.g. in
Dreier  (1990)  and  discussed  at  length  in  Chapter  6.  Other,  more  recent  lines  of
development  are  cast  within  novel  semantic  frameworks  and  constitute  a  field  of
research in bloom. What exactly are the fine-grained differences between the various
views,  and which  of  them deserve  to  be  called  “relativist”,  are  issues  that  are  not
peculiar  to  metaethics,  but  have  received  some  interest  in  philosophy  of  language
(Kölbel 2004, Stojanovic 2008, López de Sa 2011), metaphysics (Einheuser 2008), and
epistemology  (Kompa  2012).  Although  the  question  is  to  a  certain  extent
terminological, there is a substantive aspect to it. For to pin down the respects in which
relativism departs  from rival  views  is  to  identify  some  of  the  important  issues  in
metaethics,  and to  be able  to  clearly formulate  those issues  is  to  make progress  in
addressing them.
In  discussing  Egan's  view  in  the  previous  section,  we  anticipated  one  way of
marking the distinction between contextualism and relativism, namely, in terms of what
gets contributed to the content. Another way to mark the distinction is in terms of what
determines which morality is relevant to the truth value of a given moral claim. Views
that insist that the context of utterance determines this would qualify as “contextualist”,
while  those  that  deny it  (a  possible  alternative  being  that  the  so-called  context  of
assessment does it) would qualify as “relativist”. In this section, we will look more
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closely at the two distinctions, and will discuss the ways in which the truth value of a
moral claim may be sensitive to various parameters. But before we do that, it may help
to say a few words about the relationship between the metaphysical and the semantic
characterization of relativism.
Understood  as  a  claim  that  there  is  not  a  single,  universally  valid  morality,
relativism is a view that says nothing about moral language – indeed, it is a view that
would make perfect sense even if we spoke a language that had no vocabulary and no
other  linguistic  devices  to  describe  actions  as  right  or  wrong,  or  to  express  moral
imperatives such as “Thou shalt not kill”. On this metaphysical construal, relativism is
even compatible with views according to which moral claims are not even truth-value
apt. Conversely, though less obviously, the semantic construal of relativism does not
entail  commitment  to  the  metaphysical  construal  either.  There  may  be  reasons  to
develop a semantics for terms such as 'good', 'wrong' or 'ought' in which the truth value
of any claim involving such a term is sensitive to the morality parameter, and at the
same time accept the idea that for any given moral claim, there  is  one and only one
correct value for this parameter, or a “single, true morality”. To be sure, most of those
who are inclined to defend semantic relativism will be inclined to endorse metaphysical
relativism as well. However, theoretically, the two are independent. To make this clear,
it may help to draw an analogy with time. It is customary to relativize truth value to
times (Prior 1957, Kaplan 1977, Higginbotham 1993). For instance, “There has been
life on Mars” may be seen as semantically expressing a temporal proposition that is true
if evaluated at a time t1 such that there was an earlier time t1' at which it was true that
there is life on Mars, and false when evaluated at a time t2 such that there was no such
corresponding t2'. Yet, it is plausible to accept that at any given time, there is one and
only one time value at which it is correct to evaluate such a temporal proposition for its
truth value; namely, now. Thus even if a thousand years from now it will be true that
there has been life on Mars, this does not make the year 3016 an eligible time at which
we could  now  evaluate the proposition that there has been life on Mars for its truth
value.
***
Let us now turn to some preliminaries that will help to understand what a relativist
semantics for a moral language might look like. 
(i) Deontic vs. Evaluative. The moral vocabulary of English and most Indo-
European  languages  typically  includes,  on  the  one  hand,  modal  auxiliaries  such  as
'ought', 'must', 'may', which, among other, allow for a deontic reading, and, on the other
hand, evaluative adjectives such as 'good', 'bad', 'evil', and so on. This is only a rough
classification, since there are adjectives, such as 'permissible', which are taken to belong
to the deontic category (Tappolet 2013). What distinguishes evaluative terms from the
rest remains an open issue. Thus, for example, it can be debated whether “thick terms”
such as 'courageous' belong among evaluative adjectives (Chapter 13). For the sake of
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simplicity, we will focus on basic evaluative terms, and will leave aside the possible
relativist proposals for deontic modals and for 'ought' (covered in Chapter 12). For a
relativist  semantics  applied  to  'ought',  see  Kolodny  &  MacFarlane  (2010)  and
MacFarlane (2014): 285-298 (although they do not explicitly distinguish the practical
reading of 'ought' from a properly deontic reading).
(ii) Dimensions of goodness. The adjective 'good' in English (and its equivalent
in other languages) is an all-purpose evaluative adjective. We speak of good weather,
good cars, good meals, good books, none of which has anything to do with morality.
What happens when we say that a person is good? Out of the context, it might mean
almost anything: that she is a good carpenter, a good company, a good mother, a good
person (Geach 1956, Thomson 2008). Some of these interpretations may imply moral
goodness,  other  not.  Even when we restrict  the  interpretation  to  “a  (morally)  good
person”, there can still be implicit dimensions that, depending on the context, may be
required for the attribution of goodness to hold. Thus a person may be (morally) good
as regards treating others with respect, but not be so as regards helping out those who
are in need. Similarly for actions. Which dimensions are required for being considered
as good  tout court is a context-sensitive matter. This form of variability in the truth
value  of  statements  involving  'good',  even  when  narrowed  down  to  its  moral
interpretation, is not yet a hallmark of truth relativity. Thus deciding which dimensions
need to hold for the predicate 'good' to be correctly applied may be even seen as a
metalinguistic issue, as in Plunkett and Sundell (2013).    
(iii) Threshold-sensitivity.  Evaluative  adjectives  are  typically  gradable:  some
person may be better than some other; some actions may be very bad; others, scarcely
bad. Gradability means that a property comes in degrees. When a statement contains a
gradable adjective, to evaluate it for a truth value, first,  we need to fix a scale, and
second, a threshold on the scale (Kennedy and McNally 2005). Thus consider a case in
which Lei makes a $5 donation to a charity, and suppose that we have determined the
relevant scale of goodness. Then “Lei's action is good” may still have different truth
values in different contexts. In a context in which hardly anyone made any donation at
all, the threshold for a donation counting as a good action will be low, and the statement
will be true. But in a context in which everyone made a $500 donation, and Lei is rich
enough to do the same, the threshold will be higher and the statement false. Again, this
variability in truth value does not yet commit to relativism.
An interesting feature about threshold-sensitivity is that people may agree on how
things stand with respect to each other on the scale, say, of moral goodness, but disagree
on whether either of them is bad. Thus Tarek and Inma may agree that in Saskia's case,
carrying  pregnancy is  a  morally  worse  choice  than  terminating  it.  But  while  Tarek
considers that if Saskia carried pregnancy, she would do something morally bad, Inma,
who  is  less  stringent,  may  consider  that  Saskia's  action  would  not  yet  reach  the
threshold for it to be considered morally bad.
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(iv) As  a  last  preliminary,  let  us  briefly  introduce  some  notions  from  the
framework put forward in Kaplan (1977/1989) and widely adopted nowadays, which
serves as a starting point for both ways of distinguishing relativism from contextualism
that  we  will  discuss  below.  The  Kaplanian  framework  aims  to  handle  context-
dependence, in particular as it arises with indexicals – words such as 'I', 'here', 'now',
and demonstratives 'this' and 'that'. A sentence such as “I live here” can be ascribed two
kinds of meaning. One kind is that which does not vary from one context to another,
and  can  be  roughly  paraphrased  as  “The  speaker  lives  at  the  location  where  the
utterance is taking place.” The other kind of meaning – what Kaplan calls  content –
depends on who utters the sentence and where.  Thus if  Inma utters  it  in  Paris,  the
content expressed by the utterance is that Inma lives in Paris, whereas if Tarek utters it
in  Tbilisi,  the  content  will  be  that  Tarek  lives  in  Tbilisi.  Furthermore,  in  order  to
determine whether the utterance is true or false, what we need is to evaluate this content
at  what Kaplan calls a circumstance of evaluation,  which includes a possible world
parameter and a time parameter. Thus suppose that Inma lived in Paris until 2009 and in
Tbilisi from then on; however, had she gotten a job in Paris that year, she would still be
living there. Then the content that she expresses by saying, in 2016 in Paris, “I live
here”, is false as evaluated with respect to that context, making her utterance false. Yet
the same content, as evaluated at the actual world but, say, at year 2008, is true; and so
it will be if evaluated at year 2016 and at the counterfactual world in which in 2009,
Inma got a job in Paris.
***
With (ii) and (iii), we have seen how the truth value of a moral claim may depend
on parameters such as scales and thresholds. This kind of variability in truth value is a
widespread  feature  of  natural  language,  hence  hardly  controversial  at  all.  More
controversial is truth value dependence on the morality parameter.  The disagreement
between contextualism and relativism is not about the nature of the morality parameter,
but  rather,  on  the  question  of  where  it  figures  in  semantics  and  how it  gets  to  be
assigned  a  value.  What  emerges  from  the  recent  literature  on  the  contextualism-
relativism debate is that there are (at least) two important lines of divide to be made,
resulting in (at least) three views. Since both lines of divide were originally aimed at
distinguishing “contextualism” from “relativism”, the view that falls on the “relativist”
side by one divide but on the “contextualist” side by the other is, somewhat confusingly,
at  times  referred  to  as  “moderate  relativism”  and  at  others,  “nonindexical
contextualism”.  The  other  two  main  views  are  “indexical  contextualism”  and
“assessment  relativism”.  Recall  that  the  views  under  consideration  all  share  the
assumption that the truth value of a moral claim depends on the morality parameter.
Here is, then, how this class of views may be partitioned:  
(a)  Does the value assigned to the morality parameter figure in the content? The
views that  answer 'yes'  typically take moral  terms to behave like covert  indexicals,
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hence  the  label  indexical  contextualism.  The  views  that  answer  'no'  hold  that  the
morality parameter is merely needed to evaluate the content for a truth value. Let us
appeal once again to the analogy with time. Consider the sentence “A man has landed
on the Moon”. On a contextualist approach to time-sensitivity, if uttered on the 1st of
January 2016, the sentence expresses the content equivalent to “Prior to 01/01/2016, a
man landed on the Moon”. On a relativist approach, it expresses a content that does not
specify the time prior to which a man is said to have landed on the Moon. Thus the
content is true if evaluated at the present time, but false if evaluated, say, at year 1926.
Similarly, on a contextualist view, “Euthanasia is morally wrong” will express different
contents if uttered in contexts that differ with respect to morality. On a relativist view,
on the other hand, it will express the same content regardless of who utters it or in
which context, but the content that it  expresses comes out true when evaluated at a
morality that bans euthanasia, but false when evaluated at a morality that approves of
euthanasia.  
(b) Does the context of utterance supply the value for the morality parameter? First
of all, let us note that indexical contextualism answers 'yes'. As Silk (Chapter 6) puts it,
“the distinctive claim of contextualism is that a specific body of norms from the context
of utterance  figures in the conventional content of normative uses of language” (my
italics). But it is possible to answer 'yes' to this question while answering 'no' to (a). The
resulting view, “moderate relativism”, corresponds to Kaplan's view regarding the time
and world parameters,  as  applied to  the morality parameter.  In  metaethics,  possible
defenders of this view are Kölbel (2002) and Brogaard (2008, 2012), but given  that
neither of them addresses the question explicitly, they could be interpeted either way. 
To answer 'no' to the question is, again, compatible with several views. The most
popular one, assessment relativism, comes from the work of John MacFarlane, which
extends  over  several  papers  and  culminates  in  MacFarlane  (2014).  Although
MacFarlane  himself  has  never  laid  out  the  view for  evaluative  moral  terms,  other
authors  have  outlined it  (Beebe (2010),  Schafer  (2012)).  MacFarlane makes a  non-
trivial amendment to the Kaplanian framework. He posits two context parameters: in
addition to the context of utterance (CU), he introduces a context of assessment (CA).
Applying MacFarlane's framework to the moral case, we get the following picture. Just
as  in  a  Kaplanian  framework,  CU  has  two  roles:  first,  to  provide  values  for  the
interpretation of indexicals (which then figure in the content), and second, to provide
values for the parameters of world and time, which do not figure in the content but at
which the content is evaluated for a truth value. CA, on the other hand, provides values
for various other parameters, such as standards of taste, standards of knowledge, and,
crucially, moral standards. 
One driving motivation for introducing a context of assessment, in addition to the
context of utterance, is that one and the same sentence, as uttered in one and the same
context, may still have different truth values, if assessed from morally divergent points
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of view. Thus even if “Euthanasia is wrong” is uttered in a society whose moral norms
prohibit euthanasia, a person from an euthanasia-approving society may still assess that
very utterance, and (arguably) rationally so, as being false.   
Assessment relativism is not the only alternative to the idea that the context of
utterance supplies the value to the morality parameter. A reason for answering 'no' to the
question in (b) is that we may want to reject the assumption that this value is supplied is
some unique way, fully specified by principles built into the semantic theory. Stojanovic
(2012) argues that there are no good theoretical or empirical motivations for positing
such  rigid  principles,  not  only  regarding  the  morality  parameter  (or  other  novel
parameters, such as standards of taste), but even regarding the traditional parameters of
world and time. The resulting view is what we might call flexible relativism. From the
point of view of compositional semantics, flexible relativism shares the features of the
framework that moderate relativism and assessment relativism share.1 The difference is
that when it comes to deciding what truth value a given sentence, as uttered on a given
occasion, has, the decision will depend on a variety of pragmatic and possibly other
factors (2012: 631-3). Although flexible relativism may be argued to give empirically
more accurate predictions, the question of how to choose between moderate relativism,
assessment  relativism and  flexible  relativism ultimately  depends  on  certain  general
assumptions about the relationship between semantics and truth value assignment.    
***
By way of conclusion, in the past four decades, relativism has gained some ground.
From being a position all too easily discarded as implausible, it has developed into a
family of views that deserve to be taken seriously.  It is important to remember that
relativism does not entail that for any moral claim, there is some set of admissible moral
norms that makes the claim true. It only entails the that there are moral claims whose
truth value cannot be decided once for all, irrespective of some set of moral norms, or
codes, or some other suitable morality parameter on which the truth value depends.
Moral  relativism  is  thus  compatible  with  the  idea  that  there  can  be  higher  order
constraints  on the values that this  morality parameter  may take.  Not any old set  of
norms may constitute a genuine set of moral norms, and some moralities may be better
than others. How such higher order questions are to be dealt with, whether they allow
for objective answers, or whether moralities may be ranked with respect to each other
1 Note that the context of assessment only intervenes at a stage at which a sentence is evaluated for a 
truth value, which comes after the compositional derivation of its truth conditions. MacFarlane, after 
laying out the formal semantics of his relativist framework, observes: “up to this point, we have not 
needed to mention contexts of assessment. That is because, in this semantics, contexts of assessment are 
not locally relevant. Contexts of assessment are needed only in the next phase, the definition of truth 
relative to a context of use and context of assessment in terms of truth at a context of use and index. To 
distinguish this phase from the definition of truth at a context of use and index, we call it the 
postsemantics.” (2014: 151). In this respect, Schafer's claim that “[someone who endorses Moral 
Assessor Relativism] must be understood to be making a claim about (…) the sense of 'truth' with which 
one works when doing compositional semantics” (2012: 607) may be somewhat misleading. 
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only relative to something else, remain important issues for contemporary metaethical
relativism. Equally important and controversial is the issue of what precisely the nature
of the morality parameter is: is it a set of norms? a set of (possibly shared) beliefs? an
agreement to which we implicitly commit? a set of dispositions? Fortunately, it is not
necessary to  settle  that  delicate  issue  in  order  to  approach  relativism from a  more
general metaethical perspective. 
Parallel to its developments in metaethics, relativism has also made its way into the
study of natural language, leading to more and more sophisticated semantic frameworks
that are meant to model a wide range of constructions: epistemic modals, knowledge
ascriptions,  predicates  of  personal  taste,  and  so  on.  Those  recent  developments  in
philosophy of language and semantics have a double impact on metaethical relativism.
One is that some fine-grained distinctions regarding the different ways in which the
truth value of moral claims may depend on moral norms and similar factors have led to
a myriad of related but distinct positions, many of which are now preferably called
“contextualist”  rather  than “relativist”.  Secondly,  there  is  a  certain  pressure to  look
more  carefully  at  the  linguistic  behavior  of  the  expressions  that  form  our  moral
vocabulary;  these  do  not  constitute  a  unified  lexical  category,  but  include  modal
auxiliaries  (“may”,  “ought”),  both  gradable  and  non-gradable  adjectives  (“good”,
“evil”; “wrong”, “permissible”), but also certain adverbs, verbs, or nouns, which have
hardly  been  studied  in  linguistics.  There  is  also  some  pressure,  when  it  comes  to
analyzing  moral  discourse  and  moral  intuitions,  to  gather  the  empirical  data  with
respect to which the predictions of a semantic theory may be tested. A growing interest
in experimental research (Chapter 41) offers good prospects of providing such data.
Nevertheless,  despite  being  one  of  the  oldest  philosophical  doctrines,  metaethical
relativism has barely begun to mark milestones on its semantic agenda.   
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